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1 Introduction
In a recent article on “The Meta-inductivist’s Winning Strategy in the Prediction Game: A New
Approach to Hume’s Problem” [6] Gerhard Schurz proposes the Best-Alternative-Justification as a new
approach to the problem of induction. As acknowledged by Schurz, the original idea goes back to
Hans Reichenbach [3, 4]. But Schurz furnishes this idea with a new technical approach relying on a
certain class of prediction strategies which he calls “meta-inductivists”. Given that all attempts to solve
the problem of induction have hitherto failed [2], what should induce us to reconsider the sceptical
conclusion that there is no solution to the problem of induction? Prima facie, Gerhard Schurz has a
convincing answer to this question: Most of the proposed solutions to the problem of induction tried to
prove the reliability of the inductive procedure. But Schurz, following Reichenbach, merely tries to show
the optimality of a specific inductive strategy, namely his “meta-inductivist” strategy. Demonstrating
the optimality of an inductive prediction strategy is a less ambitious task than demonstrating its
reliability, because for an inductive strategy to be reliable one would have to prove that it works in
any possible world. But an inductive strategy that is merely optimal is allowed to fail in some possible
worlds, as long as in the worlds where it does not work all other possible prediction strategies are
bound to fail, too. Schurz does not raise the claim that he has solved the problem of induction literally,
but the closing paragraph of his article suggests that he believes that he has at least provided a very
good candidate for a solution to the problem of induction [6, p. 304].1
Schurz discusses the problem of induction within the technical framework of prediction games,
where a number of players have to predict the next event in a series of binary valued (0 or 1) or
real valued (any real number from 0.0 to 1.0) world events. By proving two theorems regarding the
optimality of the prediction strategies of the “weighted meta inductivist” and the “collective weighted
meta inductivist”, Schurz is at least able to give a partial solution for the problem of induction that
accounts for the case of finitely many prediction strategies. But, as shall be demonstrated in the
following, Schurz’ technical approach meets insurmountable limits once one tries to pass from a finite
number to an infinite number of prediction strategies. This raises the philosophical question whether
an optimality result demonstrated for a finite number of prediction strategies might suffice to answer
the problem of induction. If not, then providing a full solution to Hume’s problem remains an open
challenge.
In the following, I am going to briefly restate Schurz’ central results and then demonstrate that the
results for prediction games with finitely many strategies cannot be extended to prediction games with
1 Regarding this claim, see also an earlier presentation of Schurz’ ideas on the 5th GAP conference [5, p.
256].
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infinitely many strategies. Finally, there will be a brief discussion of open questions regarding Schurz’
answer to Hume’s problem.
2 Schurz’ basic approach
The technical framework within which Schurz derives his results consists of a series of events which can
either be 1 or 0 (binary prediction game) or take any real value in the closed interval from 0.0 to 1.0
(real valued prediction game) and of a set of prediction strategies that have to get as many predictions
of these events right as possible (in the binary prediction game) or that have to predict the coming
events as closely as possible (in the real valued prediction game).
Two kinds of prediction strategies occur in Schurz’ framework: Ordinary predictors that predict
the next event by some arbitrary algorithm without looking at any of the other predictors and meta-
inductivists that may – although they do not have to – base their own predictions on any of the
ordinary predictor’s predictions. The ordinary predictor’s predictions are considered to be at least
output-accessible, i.e. the meta-inductivists get informed about the ordinary predictor’s predictions
before they place their own predictions. In order to chose between the ordinary predictors, the meta-
inductivists may take into account the predictor’s success rates as well as their previous predictions.
The ordinary predictors are symbolized by Schurz with capital “P ”s with an added index, e.g.
P1, P2, etc. The meta-inductivists are symbolized as xMIi, where x is a place holder for a string of
characters that indicates the type of meta-inductivist and i is, again, an index. There exists a kind of
canonical ordinary predictor that Schurz calls the object-inductivist and which he denotes as OI. The
object-inductivist’s algorithm takes either – in the real valued prediction game – the mean value of all
past events as its next prediction or – in the binary valued prediction game – the kind of event that
had the higher frequency in the past.
If the sequence of events is a random sequence and if we exclude demonic predictors that know
the coming world event ahead of time, there exists no strategy that can do better than the object
inductivist. The meta-inductivist will consequently chose the object inductivist among the ordinary
predictors, or, if no object inductivist is present, it will predict according to the object inductivist’s
algorithm by itself. At any rate the meta-inductivist will either be as good or better than any of the
ordinary predictors.
However, in order for the meta-inductivist to be a “winning strategy” of the sort that is required
to provide a solution to the problem of induction, it must also be optimal or, at least, approximately
optimal in a “deceiving” world, where the event sequence or the other predictors or both “demonically”
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conspire against the meta-inductivist. The situation can be described as a game with the following
rules:
1. In each round, first, the ordinary predictors predict what the next event in the event sequence will
be. For making their predictions the ordinary predictors have access to the following information:
(a) Complete knowledge about the past of the game, i.e. the past event sequence and the past
predictions by all other ordinary and meta-inductivist predictors.
(b) Deceiving predictors know if and by which meta-inductivists their output will be accessed (see
point 2). However, they have to deliver their predictions before the meta-inductivists do. As
a consequence, deceivers that always have a reliable forenowledge of the predictions of the
meta-inductivists cannot exist. For, the case may arise where a deceiver would have to base
its evaluation of which prediction to deliver on a meta-inductivist’s prediction which is in turn
based on the very results of this evaluation. Now, assume a deceiver A predicts 0 whenever a
meta-inductivist MI is going to predict 1 and 1 if MI is going to predict 0 and at the same
timeMI predicts 0 when A has predicted 0 and 1 when A has predicted 1. Then, the prediction
of the deceiver would be undefined.
(c) Deceiving predictors may have the capability of clairvoyance that is, in a non deceiving world
they know beforehand what the next event will be. For reasons similar as in 1b, permanent
clairvoyants cannot exist in a deceiving world.
2. Then, the meta-inductivists make their predictions. In doing so, they may access the “output”,
i.e. the predictions, of any non meta-inductivist. Also, the meta-inductivists may – just like the
ordinary predictors – take into account the complete information about all past events and predic-
tions.
3. Finally, the world event occurs. In a deceiving world, the world event may depend in an arbitrary
way on what predictions the predictors have made.
4. A meta-inductivist “wins”, i.e. is long run optimal, if in the long run the success loss of MI as
compared to the best player at the given time converges to zero or a negative number.2 (Or, simply
put, if in the long run it performs at least almost as good as the best player.) Otherwise, the
meta-inductivist “looses” the game.
3 Schurz’ central results
Within the just sketched framework, is it possible to find a provably optimal meta-inductivist strategy?
Schurz believes it is and he presents two important theorems regarding the optimality of certain types
2 I am indepted to an anonymous referee for the precise formulation.
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of meta-inductivists. But he also relates an argument [6, p. 298] by Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi [1, p. 67]
that points out certain limits. The argument is the following:
Impossibility Theorem 1: In the binary prediction game, a single meta-inductivist cannot
be optimal in all possible worlds.
The proof of this theorem can informally be stated as follows: Assume a world with one meta-
inductivist and two alternative predictors, one of which always predicts 1 and the other always
0. Whatever the sequence of world events is, the succes rates of the two assumed alternative
predictors will always add up to 1. It follows that in any round the success rate of either the
one or the other of the two assumed alternative predictors is at least 50%. Now, if the sequence
of world events is a demonic sequence that always delivers the event that was not predicted
by the meta-inductivist, the meta-inductivist’s success rate will always remain 0%. Thus, in
any round the meta-inductivist’s success rate is significantly lower than that of the best player,
which means that the meta-inductivist’s strategy is not optimal.
Because of this, Schurz understands the different types of meta-inductivists which he develops in
section four through to section six of his article [6, p. 285-296] as only partial solutions to the problem
of induction. They are optimal in (large) classes of prediction games but not in all prediction games.
The “impossibility theorem” stated before does not cover the real valued prediction game. And in-
deed it can be demonstrated for the real valued prediction game that a meta-inductivist that averages
over the alternative predictor’s predictions weighted by the alternative predictor’s relative success-
advantage over the meta-inductivist will quickly approximate the maximal success rate of the alter-
native predictors. This is Schurz’ theorem 4 [6, p. 297], which shall be termed “optimality theorem 1”
here:
Optimality Theorem 1 for a weighted average metainductivist wMI in the real valued pre-
diction game:
1. Long run: The success rate sucn of wMI approximates the alternative predictors maximal
success rate maxsucn(P ), i.e. limn→∞(maxsucn(P )− sucn(wMI)) = 0.
2. Short run: In any round n for the success rate of wMI holds: sucn(wMI) ≥ maxsucn(P )−√
m/n with m being the number of alternative predictors.
Here P denotes the set of all alternative predictors and maxsucn(P ) denotes the maximal success
rate of the alternative predictors in round n. For the precise definition of the strategy of the weighted
average meta-inductivist and the proof of the theorem, see Schurz’ paper [6, p. 296ff.].
As can be seen, the long run success of the meta-inductivists does not depend on how many
alternative predictors are present. Only in the short run, the number or alternative predictors m is
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important in so far as the more alternative predictors are present, the more “distracted” the weighted
average metainductivist can become in the short run.
Schurz is able to prove a similar theorem for the binary valued prediction game. The impossibility
theorem stated earlier precludes that this will work for a single meta-inductivist in the binary prediction
game. But, as Schurz is able to demonstrate, the mean success rate of a collective of meta-inductivists
cwMI can approximate the maximal success of the alternative predictors – be they as demonic as they
may – almost equally well as the weighted average meta-inductivist can in the real valued prediction
game. The more cwMI predictors are present, the better the approximation. Or, more precisely:
Optimality Theorem 2 for the mean success rate of a collective of k collective weighted-
average meta-inductivists cwMI in the binary prediction game:
1. Long run: The mean success rate meansucn of the collective meta-inductivists
1
2k -approximates the alternative predictor’s maximal success rate maxsucn, i.e.
limn→∞(maxsucn(P )−meansucn(cwMI)) ≤ 12k .
2. Short run: In any round n for the mean success rate of cwMI holds: meansucn(wMI) ≥
maxsucn(P )−
√
m/n− 12k with m being the number of alternative predictors.
For the proof of this theorem and for the precise algorithm of the collective weighted-average meta-
inductivists (cwMI), see Schurz’ article [6, p. 297-299]. Again, the long run success of the collective
meta-inductivists (with regard to their mean success rates!) does not depend on the number alternative
predictors. This renders the finding non-trivial. For no matter how large the number or alternative
predictors is, their maximal success can be approximated by a comparatively smaller collective of
meta-inductivists, the precise number of which is only determined by what level of approximation is
regarded as satisfactory. It is only in the short run that a large number of possibly demonic alternative
predictors can effectively deceive the collective meta-inductivists.
4 Limitations of Schurz’ approach: Confinement to the finite
4.1 Why Schurz’ approach cannot be extended to the infinite case
Schurz explicitly restricts his investigation to prediction games with finitely many prediction strategies
[6, p. 284]. In this case the number of meta-inductivists may even be much smaller than the number
of alternative predictors. It will now be shown why a similar argument cannot be made in case the
number of alternative predictors is infinite and why, therefore, Schurz’ optimality argument is confined
to the finite.
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Impossibility Theorem 2: If there is an infinite number of alternative predictors, then even
a collective of meta-inductivists cannot perform approximately optimal in all possible worlds in
the binary prediction game.
Proof: Consider the following scenario: Let there be an arbitrary number of meta-inductivists.
As there are only two possible events, namely 1 and 0, at least half of the meta-inductivists
predicts the same event. Obviously, in each round there exists an event that is not picked by a
majority of meta-inductivists. Now, assume a demonic world where the world event is always
an event that is not predicted by a majority of meta-inductivists. Then the average success rate
of the meta-inductivists never exceeds 50%.
Now we only need to show that there can exist at least one (demonic) predictor that achieves
a higher success rate. For this purpose, split the (infinite) set of alternative predictors into two
infinite sets in the first round. The predictors in the first set predict 1, the predictors in the
other set predict 0. In the following rounds take the (infinite) set of predictors that have always
predicted true so far, split it into two infinite sets and again let all predictors from the first set
predict 1 and all predictors from the second set predict 0. In any round of the game there is thus
an infinite number of predictors left that has a success rate of 100%. Since the meta-inductivist’s
average success is significantly lower (smaller or equal 50%), their strategy is not optimal.
And, as may be expected, there is a similar impossibility theorem for the real valued prediction
game:
Impossibility Theorem 3: If there is an infinite number of alternative predictors then no
meta-inductivist xMI can be approximately optimal in all possible worlds in the real valued
prediction game.
Proof: Assume a demonic world, where the world event is always 0 or 1, whichever of these
two numbers is further away from the predicion that xMI makes. As to the infinite number
of alternative predictors: In the first round, let half of them predict 1 and the other half 0. In
the following rounds let half of the alternative predictors that have always predicted correctly
so far predict 1 and the other half 0. Then at any point in time n, there exist some predictors
with complete success, while the average success of xMI does not exceed 50%.
Hence, the conclusion: Neither in the binary nor in the real valued prediction game exists an optimal
meta-inductive strategy if the number of alternative predictors is infinite.
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4.2 A sidenote: Limitations of “one favorite” meta-inductivists
Just how difficult it is to design a meta-inductivist that covers all possible or at least all desirable
scenarios becomes apparent when considering a limitation of Schurz’ avoidance meta-inductivist, which
is the most universal type in a series of “one-favorite meta-inductivists” that Schurz develops in sections
four to six of his article.
As Schurz proves mathematically (his theorem 3), the avoidance meta-inductivist (aMI) -
approximates the maximal success of the non-deceiving alternative predictors. However, this proof
does not cover all strategies that we might intuitively consider as non-deceivers. For example, a strat-
egy that starts as a deceiver and switches to a non-deceiving clairvoyant prediction algorithm only later
in the game (after it has been classified as a deceiver by aMI) will remain classified as a deceiver by
aMI. Intuitively, though, we would probably not consider it a deceiver any more after it has switched
to a non-deceiving clairvoyant algorithm. Further below it will be demonstrated that this can even
happen accidentally for a predictor that never deceives (in an intuitive sense).
This limitation is a consequence of the fact that Schurz’ definition of “deception” is purely ex-
tensional. It is based on the predictor’s overt behaviour and not on the deceptive or non-deceptive
algorithm the predictor uses: “A non-MI-player P (and the strategy played by P ) is said to deceive (or
to be a deceiver) at time n iff sucn(P ) − sucn(P |MI) > d” [6, p. 293], where d is the “deception-
threshold” and sucn(P |MI) is P ’s conditional success-rate when MI has P as a favorite. So, contrary
to what we might intuitively think, it is not a necessary condition for being a deceiver to base the
predictions on what favorites the meta-inductivists have.
As Schurz himself notices “even an object-strategy (such as OI) may become a deceiver, namely,
when a demonic stream of events deceives the object-strategy”[6, p. 293]. This is of course to be
understood in terms of Schurz’ previous definition of deception, because the algorithm that, say, OI
uses is the same as in a non-demonic world and would intuitively not be considered as deceptive.
But then there is a finite probability that an OI will be classified as a deceiver by aMI even
though the stream of world events is not demonic in the sense that the events are computed from the
predictions made by the predictors. For there is a finite probability that a random stream of world
events accidentally mimics a demonic stream of world events up to round k so that OI appears as a
deceiver up to round k. If k is sufficiently large then aMI classifies OI as deceiver. And it will only
reevaluate OI’s status if OI lowers its unconditional success rate. “For a player P who is recorded as
a deceiver will be ’stigmatized’ by aMI as a deceiver as long as P does not decrease his unconditional
success rate (since P’s aMI-conditional success rate is frozen as long as aMI does not favor P)”[6, p.
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295]. As OI’s success rate reflects the frequency of random world events in the binary prediction game,
it is unlikely that it significantly lowers its success rate at a later stage in the game.
In such a situation aMI would fail to -approximate the maximal success of OI even though no
deception was ever intended and the conditions under which this situation can occur are completely
natural (i.e. non demonic world, no supernatural abilities like clairvyoance, etc.). Thus, if aMI can fail
to be optimal even with respect to OI under completely natural circumstances, the optimality result
concerning the performance of aMI with regards to all non-deceivers may not quite deliver what we
expect. For example, we cannot not say that aMI is optimal save for demonic conditions or deception,
if decpetion is understood in an intuitive sense as described above.
5 Open Questions
Schurz’ “New approach to Hume’s problem” is both a research program on prediction strategies and
a proposed answer to the problem of induction. As a research program it can be pursued more or
less independently of its claim to offer a new approach to Hume’s problem. Regarding this claim, the
central question is of course: Can meta-inductivists solve the problem of induction? This question can
be broken down into three separate questions.
1. How is Schurz’ model related to the problem of induction, if the latter is understood as the problem
of justifying scientific inference?
2. Does it matter that no single meta-inductivist but only a collective of meta-inductivists constitutes
an optimal strategy in the (binary) prediction game?
3. Is it acceptable that the best alternative justification works only when the number of predictors is
finite?
In order to better understand these questions, each of them shall briefly be discussed:
1) Justification of scientific inference: Schurz answers the problem of induction within a technical
framework that consists of a highly stylized world that produces a sequence of (binary or real-valued)
events at discrete time intervals. Further interpretative work might be necessary to show that the
problem of induction that has been solved within Schurz’ technical framework matches the problem(s)
of induction that occur in the real world. In particular, the kind of induction in Schurz’ model is the
induction from previous events to the next event – in contradistinction to the inductive or abductive
inference from a number of single instances to a general rule. For the justification of scientific inference,
the latter type of induction seems to be even more important. After all, we would like to know whether
we can rely on a law of nature if it has been confirmed in a finite number of instances and never
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disconfirmed. Thus, the question would be whether and how Schurz’ answer to Hume’s problem can
also be transferred to this case.
2) Admissibility of collectives of meta-inductivists: In the binary-valued game a collective of meta-
inductivists is required to assure optimality in the prediction game. Now, if we are looking for a reliable
method of induction to the next event, then we are faced with the somewhat puzzling fact that we
do not get a single proposal but a multitude of proposals instead. As follows from the impossibility
theorem for single meta-inductivists (impossibility theorem 1 above), it is impossible to melt down
the different predictions of the collective of meta-inductivists to a single prediction without becoming
vulnerable to deception by a demonic world. There is no grave problem involved if the prediction game
is considered in a decision theoretical framework [6, p. 301ff.]. For then the primary goal would not
be to get the next prediction right, but rather to derive as much utility as possible from a number
of predictions. However, this implies a shift of emphasis from the original problem of induction to a
closely related decision theoretical problem.
3) Confinement to the finite: If only a finite number of prediction strategies is taken into account,
then we exclude the overwhelming majority of possible prediction strategies from the game right from
the beginning. For, given that the sequence of events is infinite, there exists an uncountably large
number of posssible event sequences. And even if we take into consideration only those prediction
strategies which can be described by an algorithm, there still remains a countable infinity of possible
alternative prediction strategies. Unfortunately, neither a single meta-inductivist nor a collective of
meta-inductivists can perform optimal in all possible worlds if the number of alternative predictors is
infinite (see section 4.1).
Schurz deliberately restricts his investigation to prediction games with finetely many players, be-
cause he makes “the realistic assumption that xMI has finite computational means.” [6, p. 284]. But in
order to justify this restriction one would need to show that an infinite number of alternative players
is impossible, rather than arguing that xMI cannot deal with an infinite number of alternative players.
Otherwise the notice “that xMI has finite computational means” merely amounts to admitting that
under this “realistic assumption” xMI simply cannot always perform optimal.
As there is no logical contradiction involved in the assumption of an infinite number of alternative
players, the only grounds upon which Schurz’ restriction could be defended would be empirical grounds.
But then it is hard to see how the general impossibility of an infinite number of alternative players can
be demonstrated without silently or explicitly making use of inductive inference.
Very simply put, there seems to be no good reason why a theoretical framwork for answering Hume’s
problem that allows for “clairvoyants”, “deceivers”, “demonic” streams of world events, should not also
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admit infinite sets of alternative predictors. Surely, that an xMI which has only finite computational
means does not work under this condition is not a sufficient reason.
6 Conclusion
Summing it up, what can be achieved with prediction games with respect to inductive inferences is a
non-trivial result which shows that if only a finite number of prediction strategies are involved there
exists with the “(collective) weighted average meta-inductivist” a strategy that is an approximately
best strategy in all possible worlds. However, it can also be demonstrated that no approximately best
strategy exists if an infinite number of alternative prediction strategies is involved. And there is some
reason to believe that for a full solution to the problem of induction the restriction to a finite number
of alternative prediction methods is insufficient. If this is true, then the best alternative justification
cannot offer a full solution to the problem of induction.
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